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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2-2(3) (j) 
This is a negligence action in which defendant State of Utah 
was granted summary judgment which was followed by a jury trial 
in which judgment was granted in favor of the remaining defen-
dants Jimmy Ray Lingle and Roadrunner Trucking. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the trial court correctly found there was no issue 
of material fact produced by plaintiff that defective highway 
design, if any, was a contributing cause of the accidnet. 
RULES 
Rule 30(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Fay Gaw while turning left onto highway 6 in 
Helper, Utah, drove into the path of a truck driven by defendant 
Jimmy Ray Lingle and owned by defendant Roadrunner Trucking. 
Plaintiff fs pleadings alleged that she was confused because 
the State had negligently designed, constructed and maintained 
the road. Plaintiff further alleged that defendant Lingle 
negligently operated his truck. 
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The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
State of Utah which was followed by a jury trial in which judg-
ment was granted in favor of the remaining defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Just before the accident, on April 16, 1984, plaintiff 
was stopped at the stop sign at Poplar Street where it intersects 
Highway 6 at Helper, Utah. She intended to turn left and proceed 
southbound on Highway 6. Although a left turn merge lane was 
available to her, she proceeded past it and into the southbound 
through lane into the path of defendant Lingle's truck. 
(Deposition of Fay Gaw, pp. 28-35 and 37; Deposition of 
Christman, pp. 18-19, 21-23.) 
2. Plaintiff alleged that the State of Utah negligently 
designed, constructed and maintained the intersection because 
insufficient directions confused her. (R. 508, ff 12 and 22.) 
3. During her deposition, plaintiff testified: 
A. If we hadn't gone up [to Helper] for a little 
while, why, they looked like they had changed the 
lines again or added a new line or something, so 
you never know what they're doing. 
Gaw Deposition, p. 53. 
Q. (By Mr. Ogilvie) Have you had any problems with 
the changes? 
A. No. 
Gaw Deposition, p. 54. 
Q. (By Mr. Ogilvie) Mrs. Gaw, when you entered the inter-
section on the day of the accident, were you confused 
by anything. 
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A. No, cause I had driven that two or three times or more. 
Gaw Deposition, pp. 54-55. 
Q. (By Mr. Ross) Do you have any memory about whether or 
not, at the time of the accident, you were confused by 
the lane markings? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. (By Mr. Sullivan) I want to make sure you are clear on 
that last question he was asking you. At this time, 
okay, do you have any memory or do you feel that you 
were confused by any of these lines in this intersec-
tion? 
A. Not that I remember. There was - they didn't ever 
bother me before and I don't remember. 
Gaw Deposition, pp. 80-81. 
4. This defendant filed its motion for summary judgment on 
March 15, 1988. (R. 797.) On March 24, 1988, plaintiff served 
her answers to this defendant's interrogatories. In her answers, 
she stated that she was unable to refer to any document, source, 
or reference setting forth what standards she contends defendant 
did not follow or should have followed with regard to design, 
construction, care or maintenance of the intersection. Plaintiff 
further answered that she was unable to state whether she had any 
evidence that the state violated any known published standards 
pertaining to design, construction, care or maintenance of 
intersection. (R. 1313.) 
5. On May 8, 1986, plaintiff filed a motion, unsupported 
by affidavit, to extend the time in which to sign and file her 
deposition, because "during the process of reviewing the deposi-
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tion, it was learned that plaintiff was suffering from a diabetic 
condition" and that because of her condition, "it will take a 
significant amount of time to make the needed corrections in the 
deposition." (R. 263.) 
6. Plaintiff made numerous and substantial changes to both 
the form and substance of her testimony. ( R. 732-36.) 
(Deposition correction sheets attached as Exhibit "A.") Plain-
tiff changed her deposition in every respect relating to her 
testimony that she had not been confused by the highway design. 
The attempted changes which affected this defendant were: 
(a) When asked if she was quite familiar with the 
intersection, she responded "Yes, I was quite familiar with the 
whole city of Helper, all around." Gaw Deposition, p. 52, line 
5. Plaintiff changed that response to "I was not familiar with 
the intersection." The reason given for the change was "for they 
had changed it." 
(b) When asked if she had any difficulties driving in 
and through that intersection, plaintiff answered, "No, because 
that was before they made that a freeway-like, and it was just a 
regular old road." Gaw Deposition, p. 52, line 15. Plaintiff 
tried to change that answer to "Yes, it was very confusing." The 
reason given for the change was "they changed the lines again." 
(c) When asked whether she was aware of changes when 
changes were made plaintiff responded "Oh, yeah. You had to 
follow your lane. When you was in one lane, you followed it 
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until it ran out." Gaw Deposition, p. 53, line 17. That answer 
was changed to read "No, they change the lines so much." The 
reason given for the change was "you would be very confused." 
(d) When asked "Have you had problems with the 
changes?" the plaintiff simply answered "No." Gaw Deposition, p. 
54. That answer was changed to "Yes I have had trouble with the 
changes." The reason given for the change in testimony was "they 
were very confusing." 
(e) When asked whether she was confused by anything 
when she entered the intersection the day of the accident, plain-
tiff answered "No, cause I had driven that two or three times or 
more. . . . " That answer was changed to "I didn't understand the 
question." The reason given for the change was "I was confused." 
7. Defendants Lingle and Roadrunner filed a motion to 
suppress the deposition changes based upon the argument that the 
changes had not been made in compliance with Rule 30(e) of 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 411.) Plaintiff's response, 
unsupported by affidavit, was that she had learned that she was 
diabetic after her deposition was taken but before she signed it. 
The plaintiff "believed" her testimony was distorted due to her 
undiagnosed medical condition. (R. 489.) The State of Utah also 
filed a motion to suppress the deposition changes and filed 
hospital records showing that the plaintiff had been on medica-
tion for diabetes long before her deposition was taken. (R. 
574.) 
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8. The trial court granted the defendants1 motion to 
suppress the deposition changes. (R. 771.) 
9. After the trial court suppressed the deposition 
testimony changes, the plaintiff filed her affidavit in opposi-
tion to this defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 1093.) 
(A copy of the Affidavit is attached as Exhibit "B".) The state 
filed a motion to strike the affidavit. (R. 1108.) 
10. In addition to the attempted deposition changes, plain-
tiffs submitted the 3/29/88 and 4/18/88 affidavits of David 
Beaufort in & opposition to the State's motion for summary judg-
ment.1 Mr. Beaufort is a traffic engineer and accident 
reconstructionist. The Beaufort affidavit states that 
"additional driver guidance needed to be provided to meet recom-
mended standards of care of the traffic engineering profession." 
The affidavits do not state what additional guidance was needed 
nor identify any standard which requires such additional driver 
guidance. (R. 852, copy attached as Exhibit "C".) The State 
filed a Motion to Strike the affidavit. (R. 1101.) 
11. Plaintiff also submitted the affidavit of Howard 
Anderson, a licensed engineer, who opined that the design of the 
intersection in question "is totally in conflict with normal 
engineering practices. . . . In my opinion, this highway design 
led to confusion on the part of Mrs. Gaw, and was a contributing 
1In its Minute Entry of 5/16/88 the Court denied plaintiff's 
motion to extend time for filing the second Beaufort affidavit. 
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cause t * n accide** * final paragraph Anderson's 
a f f' i * a 
accident &^UK *H I i *. * ^opinions are subject * -ore odifi-
catio i aft* % r.^ *- further analysis and obtain dxi U t : facts." 
I«, | 
•-s memorandum decision on the motions for summary 
judgmen" - <* court stated: 
The affidavits submitted to try to demonstrate that 
there was a faulty highway design state conclusions 
without foundation as to the highway design and they Ic 
not specify what standards the state did no+- fr^iow or 
should have followed in this instance. 
(Ill I l l i ' , | i j ,i![ t a i / h e d dti K x h l b i t Il ' ) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
•i! t] - u n *: o'ant of summai -. ludgment i, : 
.-- -. + o sho1'v * r affirms J > se 1 In-1 < L 
f i • whether a defect., highway design i , u u • >J or 
: . ~ributed t. t ,N« accident. 
2. 
suppress the plaintiff's attempts to change her deposit. i::>r 
testimony. The changes were not maH«» }\y ttie officer noj. oworn to 
an I In n i<' wi 'i i HI '.'»in. 
3. . The tr ial court did ; ••, disregarding the ' .. • 
engineering affidavits submitted ..••»•• .
 : .y . * } 
mdai :it t s •' I I ::> I:::i :: i :i f> :: •] : Si I: : i _ J -. . did 
^ *, ,. unipiv with Utah Rule of Civi ] Proceau. f ~>6(e) because they 
did not set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence as 
to what the State did or should have done that made the highway 
design defective, but merely set forth unsubstantiated opinions 
and conclusions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY SUPPRESSED 
PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION CHANGES FOR FAILURE TO 
COMPLY WITH RULE 3 0(e). 
Plaintiff testified unequivocally in her deposition that she was 
familiar with this intersection and was not and never had been 
confused by its design. Plaintiff so answered even when ques-
tioned by her own attorney. 
Rule 30(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that: 
Any changes in form or substance which the witness 
desires to make shall be entered upon the deposition by 
the officer with a statement of the reasons given by 
the witness for making them. . . . If the deposition 
is not signed by the witness within 30 days of its 
submission to him, the officer shall sign it and shall 
state on the record the fact of the waiver. . . . 
The changes plaintiff attempted to make in her deposition 
were not made upon the deposition by, nor sworn to before, the 
officer. Nor was the deposition signed within 30 days of its 
submission to plaintiff. Plaintiff did make a motion for 
extension of time, unsupported by affidavit, claiming that plain-
tiff between the time of her deposition and the signing of it had 
been diagnosed as diabetic. Defendants refuted that claim with 
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hospital records showinq that plaintiff was being treated for 
diabetes li-ii-i In- lnr< II Ii|im.it mi ill Ih h • t - i "I il i i-uords 
were produced, plaint ill wisely dropped the i.'laim that het 
"undiagnosed" diabetes affected her testimony necessitating 
chtinaoi- i 11 In • i i In •(M » i I 11 HI 
Although plaintiff's brief describes the tria ] court fs 
suppression of the deposition rhnnqes as "unusual ," s u c h i s n o t 
t:l u = : .ai..» I I i i I in I.MI<I I I 11 P I if or ce Ru] e 3 0 (e) or any other 
nil e of procedure. 
In Architectural League of New York, v Bartos 4 04 F Si ip }:: 
3 0 1 (S ID I" I ) Itl: :u = c oi lr t: he ] d • J ep, >s i t . o:\ange i. a re 
inoperative it made i n the deponent' r- . : instead of ^ ~he 
officer ^r * unaccompanied h\ a statement 
11 <" ,' 111 • ' a IL; e t e i i e d 1111 HI >. > . .1 i
 f Allen & Co. v. 
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 49 F,R, 
required that deposition changes btj 
barlow v. Esselt Pendeflex Corp., • 404 
(\- • >-fi*-., afffd, 838 F.2d 1209, the court held that ol*j -
tin • - py4---- -; * * changes II::, :: I: I = J : deposj t:i oi it t = s I::i ITI<:::>:i: \\ Il: :: I: , t 
where the deposition was useless, warranted the sanction of 
deeming plaintiff to have refused to have si gned or to have 
an accurate representati oi :i of the deposition testimony Tl La t 
ruling is most applicab] e here The plaintiff*-- s^j_e allegation 
a q i i i n s t " I  Ih state \ \ c .s tl ic t: tl I = :i i I tei: sec il:" i -si cm was confus-
ing. Plaintiff testified unequivocally in her deposition that 
she was not confused by the intersection. Her subsequent deposi-
tion changes, in her own hand and unsworn, completely retracted 
her deposition testimony making it useless and depriving the 
state of its opportunity to cross-examine. 
After her deposition changes were suppressed, plaintiff 
filed her affidavit attempting the same changes in testimony the 
court had already suppressed. In Willco Kuwait (Trading) S.A.K. 
v. DeSavory, 638 F. Supp. 846 (D.R.I. 1986), remanded in part on 
other grounds, affirmed in part, 843 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1988), an 
affidavit which attempted to make substantive changes in a depo-
sition was held inadmissible because it would have deprived the 
opposing party of an opportunity to cross examine the witness. 
The first excuse for changing her testimony was medical 
disability. When that was disproven by her medical records she 
never again mentioned it. Instead, she adopted the "I was con-
fused" theory. If she was referring to confusion at the time of 
the accident, then she has given no reason at all for changing 
her deposition testimony as the rule requires. If she was refer-
ring to confusion during the deposition, it is certainly not 
apparent in the record. She was asked by two defense attorneys 
as well as her own attorney whether the intersection was confus-
ing and she said "no." If she was confused during the deposition 
it was her attorney's obligation to clear up any confusion then. 
Any other rule would allow an attorney to sit idly by while his 
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client's testimony destroyed their case knowing that .* omplete 
r e t r a c t i o n lu u i i h ^ i i i j f i n t III!1 .ui'ui n , ItdltdWI l l h l l l r l M l i q c 
made, ,i^ , ., - .<.,,< emasculates the deposition as a discovery 
tool, denies opposing counsel the right to cross examine and 
v I u I «i I M S Ik mi I i, I") . 
The triaJ court did not PTT simply by requiring compliance 
with rule 30(e). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY
 DISREGARDING 
ENGINEERING AFFIDAVITS WHICH DID NOT COMPLY 
WITH RULE 56(e). 
Anderson Af f idav '.J 
: I d a 11 o f 1 1 • :: w a. . .iders oi 
oppositac • • n*. State's motion for summary .i;r f i a m t i f f 
ar g u e c in r^~? appeal brief that the Anders: 
1
 HXL'K i! daw was confuseu sintiit'o Brief 
J - • mderson affidavit d* •: •. provide evidence of 
anythim - ~ * • -agraph ' : 
11. As a final comment, I have not yet had an 
opportunity to visit the accident scene. My opinions 
are subject to some modification after I make further 
anal ysi s and obtai n a] 1 the facts. 
Mr. Anderson also admi tted in h i s affidavit 
j £Q no^: ye^ j i a v e complete accident ... .(; ~ on tiie inter-
section, and I do not have an hourly ~unt of traffic 
at the intersection. Without an hourly count of traf-
fic, I cannot review signal, war**=*"• ^  */"t'" the Helper 
area. 
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Nevertheless, he opines that a signal at one of the three Helper 
intersections should be installed. Based upon Mr. Anderson's own 
admissions within the affidavit that he has insufficient facts 
upon which to base an opinion, the affidavit is meaningless. 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
(e) Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would 
be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively 
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated therein. 
Mr. Anderson's Affidavit does not meet the requirements of 
Rule 56(e). He admits lack of personal knowledge and competence 
to testify. Nor does he set forth facts as would be admissible 
in evidence. The affidavit contains nothing but unsubstantiated 
conclusions. 
In Norton v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed a grant of summary judgment for the defen-
dant even though the plaintiff filed her own affidavit in opposi-
tion to the motion. The Court held that since the plaintiff's 
statements in the affidavit concerning fraud were conclusory and 
did not specify what words were spoken by the defendant, the 
statements would not be admissible in evidence and could not be 
considered on summary judgment. See also Treloggan v. Treloggan, 
699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985) (affidavits on information and belief 
revealed no evidentiary facts, but merely reflected affiants 
unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions which were insufficient 
to raise an issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.) 
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rie- iiflsp at ^irn tM, *ndersi fidavit concludes that 
Gdw was confused. The Affidavit, however, does not specify what 
the State should have done * ,%' * L., uiie 
j: • ] a I i 1 t: :i f f i ? egui at - ^ n wa s 
violated as wei1 as specify the ao> omission which failed * 
meet standards : lusion that ** in^\, *y wa- defective I v 
u> • • . , . • • • ~ . admissibi < -*»-
trial and, therefore t t> a: -)u: i correctly ruled that the 
Affidavit * '* - * create issue ui mdt-en 11 tar' . 
B. : : . 
The Beaufort Affidavit fails t compl\ ith ^ .ie • -
the same reasons. The A f f i < i<\ <» 
as "additional driver guidance needed * \ *- .loviu^d 
recommended standards of care of the traffic engineering profes-
sion "il 
a driver tuinii.^ .*; - .. Popper Street These are net viden-
tiary facts. These statements are unsubstantiated cone- lusory 
1111 in 11 i i u i 1 " ij n u l r 
standard which wi. violated no, :; ;* any standard was vacia'-ed. 
Even assuming the plaintiff submitted an affidavit 
ere 
st i , i would oe •- . . : material fact < i ,P , t causa-
t .- because ^f * ***> Laintiff's own testimony that trie highwav 
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The trial court correctly disregarded the affidavits because 
they did not meet rule 56(e) requirements. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff testified unequivocally that she was not 
confused by the intersection. Her answers to interrogatories 
state she is "unable" to identify any evidence that the intersec-
tion design violated any standard or regulation. Affidavits 
submitted by plaintiff did not comply with Rule 56(e) nor did 
they set forth what the State did or should have done which 
violated any standard. Therefore the trial court correctly ruled 
that there was no evidence that defective highway design, if any, 
caused the accident and the summary judgment in favor of the 
State should be affirmed. 
DATED this // day of September, 1989. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
JON lA ^ Sanders 
Aytoineys for Defendant State 
jbf Utah 
JLS438 
14 
ADDENDUM 
DESCRIPTION 
Deposition Correction Sheet Transcript 
Deposition of Fay <^ aw 
Affidavit n, 
Affidavit id Beaufort 
Memorandum Decision on Motions for Summary 
Judgment 
Rule 30, Submission to witness, changes; 
signing. 
Rule 56 , " " " • F a I" f Idav i ts; further 
testimony; aetense required. 
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Exhibit B 
DANIEL F. BERTCH - A4728 
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4001 South 700 East, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FAY GAW, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
et al. 
Defendants. 
i AFFIDAVIT OF FAY GAW 
i Civil No. 14630 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Fay Gaw, having been first duly sworn on oath, 
states as follows: 
1. I am the plaintiff in this lawsuit. 
2. At the time of the accident I thought I was 
turning left into the left turn merge lane. This is what I 
said at my deposition. I thought that I was hit while I was 
in the merge lane. Based on that impression, I stated at my 
deposition that I was not confused. 
Later on in the deposition, someone told me that 
the accident happened in the through lane. At that point, I 
said I did not remember whether I was confused at the time of 
the accident. 
4. If I was actually turning left into the 
through lane, I was confused because I thought I was turning 
into the left turn merge lane when in fact I was turning into 
the through lane, I tried to change my deposition answer to 
state this. 
5. The pavement lines at that intersection were 
always confusing, I said this at my deposition. 
6. Some of the answers I gave at my deposition 
were mistaken, or confused. After reviewing my deposition 
answers, I attempted to make the corrections listed on the 
attached correction sheets. 
DATED this J? / day of /yytg^uc^j , 1988. 
FAY GAW 
Subscribed and sworn to before me t h i s 3/ day 
of /tfd.ntU , 1988. 
j s i d i n ^ a t ; T(rv<t> /M-
My Commission Expires: 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
£g%r of "fl\m>k , I certify that on the 
1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF 
FAY GAW, (Gaw v. State of Utah) postage prepaid, by deposit-
ing a copy of the same in the U.S. mail, to the following: 
Joy Sanders 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Clifford C. Ross 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
175 South West Temple, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Doug Bayly 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
175 South West Temple #510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
^K'HU/IJJ{ 
Exhibit C 
DANIEL F. BERTCH - A4728 
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4001 South 700 East, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FAY GAW, 
VS. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, ) 
et al. 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
| DAVID BEAUFORT 
i Civil No. 14630 
David Beaufort, being first duly sworn -upon oath, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am a Traffic Engineer and Accident Recon-
structionist employed by Wayne T. VanWagoner and Associates, 
Inc. (WVW), engaged in specialty engineering regarding 
traffic safety. 
2. Wayne T. VanWagoner and Associates, Inc. has 
been retained by the law firm of Robert J. DeBry & As-
sociates. I have inspected and surveyed the accident scene 
where a collision occurred between vehicles driven by Fay 
Gaw and Mr. Lingle. 
3. The accident scene geometry and delineation 
pattern had not changed from the time of the accident to the 
time of the survey of the accident intersection conducted by 
WVW. The State of Utah's response to interrogatories is the 
basis for my conclusion, which states that the only change to 
the intersection was an addition of a solid white channeliz-
ing stripe for west to southbound left-turning traffic from 
Poplar Avenue. This channelizing stripe existed at the time 
of the WVW survey. There were no arrows defining or guiding 
traffic into the left turn merge lane to continue southbound 
on SR 6 at the time of the WVW survey. 
4. The inconsistent intersection geometry and 
channelization techniques at the intersection did not provide 
adequate information to meet a left-turning driver's 
expectancy, and to provide adequate positive guidance. 
Therefore, additional driver guidance needed to be provided 
to meet recommended standards of care of the traffic 
engineering profession. 
5. The importance of meeting a driver's expectan-
cy and the importance of positive guidance has been docu-
mented for many years. "The results of this research point 
strongly to the fact that good driver communication is only 
achieved by proper coordination among all roadway and terrain 
features and the devices used to guide, warn, direct, 
2 
regulate or control traffic operation" (1) page * In this 
sa m e F e d e r a l H i g h w a y /Viun n i st rat i^ ii Inpoit , I In reduction 
stated: "Existing communication systems between the highway 
and the driver are sometimes inadequate for one or more of 
the £ o J 1 ow 1 ng reasoi is ( 2 ) fa :i ] i ire t.o • *>nvpv a clear 
message, thus leading the driver to make ar- .ncorrect 
decision resulting in improper maneuvers and sometimes loss 
of control ol Ins "« eh Lc.le ' ( 1 ) p , I The conclusions from 
this widely recognized report emphasize the interrelationship 
between individual design criteria. " Whei i cons i ciered 
separately, tbp various elements that go together to make up 
the total design generally result in a design that satisfies 
all the minimum criteria, bi :it dc: es n : • t necessarily meet the 
requirements of the driver" (1) p 12. This intersection 
does not meet the requirements of vdriver turning left from 
Poplar St reel:. 
b. The i*~i' of driver guidance, which was 
identified during the accident srerip inspection is sig-
nificant wi: ' I lip |IHI spectivt v driver 
starting from the stop sign on the east leg of Poplar Avenue 
and proceeding to cross. This approach of examining and 
visi ia.1 i zi i ig the clesi gi i f i: om 1:1: le dr i ver ' s perspective has been 
emphasized in the evaluation of a design, A 1975 publication 
by the Federal Highway Administration states The geometric 
3 
design, the traffic interaction, and the traffic control 
devices all need to be examined from the driver's eye level 
to determine what expectancies are being created and whether 
these expectancies are reinforced or violated" (2) p. 48. 
REFERENCES 
1. Driver Expectancy Checklist, A Design Review Tool, 
American Associates of State Highway Officials, 
1972. 
2. Positive Guidance in Traffic Control. U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 1975. 
FURTHER, AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED this ^ 9 day of Cffi&AsU^ , 1988 
t)AVID BEAUFORT 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day 
of ^(/lA^Ji^ 1988. 
'NOTARY P U B L I C ' 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
< ] I 
V 
4 
<5S) 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on the o?*7 day < '/)I//f/j2/{_ ,^ a ^ 
true copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID BEAUFORT, (Gaw 
v. State of Utah) was mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing 
a copy of the same in the U.S. mail,, to the following: 
Joy Sanders 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Clifford C. Ross 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
175 South West Temple, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Doug Bayly 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
175 South West Temple #510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(ssZ) 
Exhibit D 
DANIEL F. BERTCH - A4728 
ROBERT J . DEBRY - A0849 
ROBERT J . DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P l a i n t i f f 
4001 South 700 E a s t , F i f t h F loor 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84107 
Te l ephone : (801) 262-8915 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
CARBOH COUNTY. U7AH 
FILED 
HAY 12 1383 
NORMAL POCHARD. CLERK 
D E P U T Y a 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FAY GAW, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ; 
STATE OF UTAH, et al. ] 
Defendants. 
| AFFIDAVIT OF HOWARD 
) ANDERSON 
) Civil No. 14630 
STATE OF UTAH ) )ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
COMES NOW Howarc 3 A i idei: s oi i, a £ t ei: f I r s t be ing duly 
sworn, deposes and says: 
1 My name is Howard Anderson. My address is 111 
P l a n t l it I n i l [ M I vi« , i\ «? '-< " i f i t y , Nn va< la 1 
2 I am a licensed engineer and have testified as 
an expert highway design approximately o ( 5 times. A copy 
• 1 my . . - - -. -J' - .;- ttached. 
3 I have been asked to review and analyze the 
intersection of Poplar Avenue and Route fi in Helper, Utah, 
Specifically, I have been asked to analyze the intersection 
with regard to motorists turning left from Poplar Avenue onto 
Route 6. 
4. I have been provided a diagram of the layout 
of the Route 6-Poplar Avenue intersection. A reduced copy 
of that diagram is attached to this affidavit. I have 
reviewed the police reports and photographs. I have read 
the deposition of Fay Gaw and her affidavit. I have reviewed 
the traffic court data consisting of the average daily 
traffic count. These materials are customarily relied upon 
by highway design professionals in analyzing the safety of an 
intersection. 
5. I do not yet have complete accident data on 
the intersection
 f and I do not have an hourly count of 
traffic at the intersection. Without an hourly count of 
traffic, I cannot review signal warrants for the Helper area. 
6. In my opinion, the intersection design for 
drivers turning left from Poplar Avenue onto Route 6 fails to 
meet accepted standards of safety in highway design. As a 
result of these failures, the intersection is defective and 
dangerous for motorists turning left onto Route 6. The 
reasons for my opinions are set forth in more detail in the 
following paragraphs. 
2 
7. There are three major intersections in Helper. 
They all have relatively heavy turning movements and all are 
intersections without active traf* \t ^onVr < i 1 devices. In 
looking at the traffic movements and the high speed road 
onditions on Route 6, in my opinion, one of the three 
intersecti ons shoi ;a 1 d be si gna ] izc= • d (i • 3 . hv€ • a 1:i:af f ic signal 
installed) . Even if traffic movements on any one of the 
local streets did not meet all the hourly warrants for a 
signal, tin;,- signal should be installed because: 
a, A signal would facilitate crossing movements 
at the intersection. For example, a vehicle 
must accelerate approximately 80 feet from the 
stop bar on Poplar Avenue to clear the far 
side of the intersection. .This requires a 
long gap in traffic and good judgment on the 
part of the local drivers crossing this 
totally unpatrolled hi qh speed hi ghway. 
ft signal would inform motorists oiI Route 6 
that they are entering a community where 
f requent tra f f i c con f 1 :i <::::t: s c ai I be expec ted. 
c, Most importantly, a signal at any one of the 
Helper intersections would provide traffic 
gaps for t he othei two intersections* 
3 
8. The striping and the islands are inadequate 
and pose a challenge to even a frequent user of the intersec-
tion. An inxequent or first-time user can easily be mislead 
into making the wrong decision. Traffic leaving Poplar 
Avenue and turning left onto Route 6 is a relatively high or 
heavy movement of about 1200 vehicles per day. At conven-
tional divided highways such as Route 6, that left turn 
movement would be made onto the far side of the median 
(shaded in red on the attached diagram), directly into the 
through lane, or into an acceleration lane located directly 
next to the through lane. That would be a driver's normal 
expectancy, and the normal intersection design. 
9. I have never seen a four legged intersection 
with a merge lane on the near side of a median, except at 
Helper, Utah. Traffic turning left from Poplar Avenue onto 
Route 6 must turn prior to reaching the divided island, and 
at that point, conflicts with traffic turning left from Route 
6 onto Hill Street. ThiS left turn movement onto Hill Street 
at times will block the movement of Poplar Avenue traffic 
onto Route 6. 
10. The intersection layout separates traffic 
traveling in the same direction with an island median, while 
separating traffic traveling in opposite directions with a 
4 
stripe median. This is totally in conflict with normal 
engineering practices. This conflict can and will fail to 
meet reasonab] e dri v er expectancy. I.. J • , ' \ion, this 
highway design led to confusion on the part f Mrs, Gawf and 
was a contributing cause to the accident. 
11. final comment, iavp not yet had an 
opportunity to visit the accident scene *\ opinions are 
subject to some modification after i— «: alysis 
and obtain all the facts. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
of ^-fY)(uJ _ , 1988. 
/M .day 
^ 
NOTARY /PUBLIC 
Residing a t : ^laJJ-sr^J? 
/r,NOT WW 
PUBUC 
\rf\ CommiS*»»pir8»( 
ADO. 27. 7 
5 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on the jday of_ 
1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF 
HOWARD R. ANDERSON (Gaw v. State of Utah) postage prepaid, by 
depositing a copy of the same in the U.S. mail, to the 
following: 
Joy Sanders 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Clifford C. Ross 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
175 South West Temple, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Doug Bayly 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
175 South West Temple #510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
^lujri^ -idma 
6 
Exhibit E 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
CARBON COUNTY. UTAH 
F I L E D 
JUrI-8 !2S3 
II I THE SEVENTH: J ( JDICIAL DISTRICT C ^ ^ H ^ R u g i ^ | 9 ^ K C O U N T Y 
STATE OF UTAHr 
rrpHTY 
-CC^zL &&L*t 
FAY GAW, 
vs , 
P l a i n t i f f , 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its Department of Transportation, 
CARBON COUNTY, CITY OF HELPER, 
JIMMY WRAY LINGLE, ALLSTATE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois 
corporation, and JOHN DOES I 
through X, 
Defendants, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
ON MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
C ivi 1 No 4t?Jd 
The defendant, State of Utah, has moved for summary 
judgment in its favor contending that there are no issues of 
material tdcl: relative to this defendant and that the plaintiff 
has no cause of action against the State of Utah, The Court 
has received the parties' Memorandums of Legal point's and. 
Authorities, considered the Affidavits submitted and the 
published Depositions, and heard oral arguments of the parties 
and rules on t 1: Ie State ' s M< :>ti oi: I as her ei naf tei sta t f *d, 
The State defendant has also moved Court to 
strike the Affidavit of Mr. Beaufort on several grounds. It 
would appeal In I he Cuuit thai I he plai nl i f f has nH compile! 
with Rule 2,8 of the Uniform Rules of Practice for the District 
Court n submitting the various memorandums and affidavits that 
the .-..'* shn'lfp f-ho 
Affidavits of Mr. Beaufort as it relates to the Motion of the 
State since the Court feels that the Motion can be disposed of 
without that necessity. 
An examination of the Deposition of the plaintiff 
shows that she was not confused by any of the lines on the 
highway or anything else at the intersection prior to the 
accident. The statements are definite and the Court will not 
allow her to change those statements by affidavits submitted 
after the time of her deposition since she has offered no 
explanation as to why she would be mistaken at the time of her 
deposition. 
The affidavits submitted to try to demonstrate that 
there was a faulty highway design state conclusions without 
foundation as to the highway design and they do not specify 
what standards the State did not follow or should have followed 
in this instance. 
Therefore, the Court finds that it is undisputed 
that the plaintiff was not confused by the highway design at 
the time of the accident and that the plaintiff has been unable 
to produce any evidence that the highway design was faulty and 
that the faulty design, if any, caused the resulting accident. 
Therefore, the Court concludes that the plaintiff 
does not have a cause of action against the State of Utah and 
grants the Motion for Summary Judgment and the attorney for the 
2 
State is directed to prepare a formal judgment in accordance 
with this opi i :ii on. 
The defendants, Lingle and Roadrunner Trucking 
Company, have also made a motio n f o r s u mm a i: ;y j u d g me • i 1 1 
contending that there are no genuine disputed issues of 
material fact and that based upon those undisputed facts they 
are entitled t<: • a judgment : of nc i :::ause of acti on. 
It would appear to the Court that the first 
affidavit of Mr• Beaufort, which the Court will not strike at 
this time, does establish sufficient issues of fact that thi s 
matter should be presented for trial and determination by a 
fact finder. 
Therefore. * 1 i*:: Court denies the Motion of Lingle and 
Roadrunner for summary judgment and the attorney for the 
plaintiff is instructed p i: e p a r e a f o i: m a 1 <:> i: d e i: i i 1 a c c c • r d a n e e 
with this decision. 
DATED this 'JF day of June, 1988. 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of 
the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT by depositing the same in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Clifford C. Ross 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorneys at Law 
650 Clark Learning Office 
Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Daniel F. Bertch 
Attorney at Law 
6558 South Stanwick Road, #22 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
G. Steven Sullivan 
Robert J. Debry 
ROBERT J. DEBRY ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys at Law 
965 East 4800 So., Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Joy Sanders 
Jody Burnett 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
L. Rich Humpherys Edward O. Ogilvie 
CHRISTENSEN JENSEN & POWELL ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
510 Clark Learning Office Center Litigation Divison 
175 South West Temple 236 State Capitol Buidling 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Lewis B. Quigley 
MASCARO & QUIGLEY 
Attorneys at Law 
7434-South State, Suite 201 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
DATED this day of June, 1988. 
4f?^ 
Secretary 
(f5s^ 
Exhibit F 
(e) Submission to witness; changes; signing. 
When the testimony is fully transcribed the deposition 
shall be submitted to the witness for examination and 
shall be read to or by him, unless such examination and 
reading are waived by the witness and by the parties. 
Any changes in form or substance which the witness 
desires to make shall be entered upon the deposition by 
the officer with a statement of the reasons given by 
the witness for making them. The deposition shall then 
be signed by the witness, unless the parties by 
stipulation waive the signing or the witness is ill or 
cannot be found or refuses to sign. If the deposition 
is not signed by the witness within 30 days of its 
submission to him, the officer shall sign it and state 
on the record the fact of the waiver or of the illness 
or absence of the witness or the fact of the refusal to 
sign together with the reason, if any, given 
therefore; and the deposition may then be used as fully 
as though signed unless on a motion to suppress under 
Rule 32(d)(4) [Rule 32(c)(4)] the court holds that the 
reasons given for the refusal to sign require rejection 
of the deposition in whole or in part. 
Exhibit G 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; 
defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and 
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto 
or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits 
to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a 
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, 
but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he 
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against him. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondent to the following on the 11th day of September, 1989. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
Robert J. DeBry & Associates 
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Robert R. Wallace 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
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